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This article reconceptualizes the idea of the impartiality of UN peacekeeping in light of 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel. It considers the role 
that sexual exploitation and abuse play both during and after conflict. This paper argues that 
sexual exploitation and abuse are political acts which bring about financial and propagandist 
benefits for the warring parties. It then tracks the history of neutrality in UN peacekeeping – 
originally defined as objective inaction against the warring parties – and its development into 
impartiality – now identified as unbiased interference, but with greater reference to core 
universal values such as fairness and justice. Peacekeepers’ involvement in sexual 
exploitation and abuse is of political advantage to the parties and therefore breaches the 
principle of impartiality.  
______________________________________________ 
 
This article considers the role that neutrality and impartiality have played in UN 
peacekeeping doctrine and the impact that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 
by peacekeepers have had on these principles. Much has been written about the 
neutrality/impartiality of various specific peacekeeping missions vis-à-vis the parties 
involved in the conflict and the relationship between the mission mandate, its execution and 
the peacekeepers themselves.1 However, very little has been written about the threat posed to 
neutrality/impartiality by SEA by UN peacekeepers. The UN identifies a potential for such a 
threat, but has little to say about how or why this might have arisen, and the impact that it 
might have. Thus, the purpose of this article is to explore in more detail the manner in which 
SEA constitutes a threat to the neutrality/impartiality of UN peacekeeping. The article begins 
by analysing the historical development and meaning of the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. It argues that the principle of neutrality that was originally applied to UN 
peacekeeping underwent mandated reform after the conflicts of the early 1990s, and was 
replaced by the principle of impartiality. This section of the paper explores the different 
meanings of those terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ and the catalyst that brought about this 
change. It examines the importance of neutrality/impartiality for peacekeeping doctrine and 
(arguably) for the legal status of peacekeeping operations.  
 
The terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ have controversial meanings in peacekeeping 
doctrine. The UN definition of these terms is discussed below, but some studying these 
concepts have argued for the need to distinguish between the mandate of a peacekeeping 
mission and the practice of the mission in the field. Nicholas Tsagourias differentiates 
between the two on the basis that ‘[n]eutrality refers to the character of a PKO [peacekeeping 
operation], whereas impartiality is an operational term and refers to the conduct of the 
operation.’2 Jane Boulden on the other hand retains use of the term ‘impartiality’, rather than 
‘neutrality’, but contends that ‘the impartiality of a UN mandate needs to be considered 
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separately from the impartiality of the implementation of that mandate.’3 Whatever 
terminology is applied, it seems that there is a distinction between the nature of a 
peacekeeping operation, determined by the mandate given to it by the Security Council, and 
the way in which that operation is actually executed in the host state. This article is concerned 
with the latter situation. Moreover, among academics and staff in the UN itself, the terms 
‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ have at times been seen as synonymous and interchangeable. It 
is only relatively recently that they have been treated as distinct concepts. For the sake of 
clarity this article maintains the current usage of the words, as distinct concepts, with distinct 
meanings. 
 
Finally, the term ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ is used here according to the UN definitions. 
Thus SEA means 
 
any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, 
or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another... [or 
the] actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by 
force or under unequal or coercive conditions.4  
 
The term ‘SEA’ is used here to cover instances of non-consensual sexual contact as well as 
sexual contact that is ostensibly consenting, for example, where the women involved are 
engaged in survival prostitution,5 with either UN personnel or personnel from parties to the 
conflict.  
 
The Politicized Role of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
 
Security Council Resolution 1325 recognized that women require special protection from 
gender-based violence during armed conflict.6 Yet UN peacekeepers have themselves been 
implicated in SEA, raising serious questions about their responsibility to protect and their 
impartiality in peacekeeping operations.  
 
The SEA of women has been observed to be a common and widespread feature of military 
conflict, both historically and in the present age.7 Indeed, instances of rape by military 
personnel during wartime have been shown to be significantly higher than both civilian rapes 
during wartime and military rapes during peacetime.8 All too often, the SEA of women is 
viewed as the ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ consequence of the breakdown of law and order in a 
conflict-ridden state. But SEA is far from ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’. Rather, it is often a 
conscious political act deeply rooted in the political economy of war.9 Two dominant trends 
can be identified.  
 
First, SEA has emerged as a consequence of the development of ‘transborder shadow 
economies’.10 In brief, the existence of shadow trade in resources and services has become a 
major source of funding for rebel forces since the end of the Cold War. Thus, ‘those seeking 
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to oppose or replace the state in a violent manner engage in asset accumulation through 
parallel or shadow economies, including trafficking in minerals, gems, timber, gold, illegal 
drugs and humans.’11 Such asset accumulation substitutes for the role of the conventional 
state-based war economy – it allows weapons to be bought and fighters to be paid, furthering 
the rebel’s goal of using military might to achieve political and economic power.12 The 
abduction, sale and purchase of human beings is a common feature of shadow economies,13 
with the sexual trafficking and prostituting of women and children a profitable way of 
boosting the coffers. ‘Military and non-military trade becomes entwined’.14 In addition, 
members of both state and rebel forces may seek to take advantage of their place in this black 
market economy by securing such commodities for themselves: sexual and domestic slavery 
and the taking of temporary wives have become commonplace during such conflicts.15 
According to Amnesty International, the trafficking of women and girls for SEA and forced 
labour takes place in 85 per cent of conflicts,16 with cases of abduction, trafficking, sexual 
slavery and prostituting of women documented in Angola, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Uganda, Sierra Leone,17 Sudan,18 Mozambique19 and 
Serbia,20 for example. The SEA of women in an arena of conflict is thus an essential element 
of the war economy created to supply resources to the different warring factions. 
 
Second, the SEA of women that takes place during conflict is often used for propaganda 
purposes by parties to the conflict. SEA – both actual and threatened – becomes a political act 
in and of itself, used as propaganda either to frighten the enemy’s men and women or to 
provide a rallying cry for support of the ally’s cause. ‘At the heart of this rhetoric is the 
notion that women – and in particular women’s bodies, sexuality and reproductive capacity – 
are the repositories of the community’s honour.’21 Thus, where SEA is threatened or used 
against an enemy, the honour of the enemy nation is tarnished and the masculinity of its men 
called into question by their inability to protect ‘their’ women. Where it is threatened or used 
by the enemy against the ally, this ‘is commonly used to strengthen the sense of communal 
solidarity and increase fear and distrust of the “enemy”’.22 Catherine MacKinnon, for 
example, cites the use of films of the rape of allegedly Serbian women in propaganda aimed 
at stirring-up Serb nationalism.23 Amnesty International reports that the rape of Muslim 
women in the Indian state of Gujarat arose out of the ‘distorted history [that] was used to 
promote the myth and imagery of the virile, violent Muslim man and the victimized Hindu 
woman’,24 and therefore justified such ‘revenge’ rapes by Hindu men. The propaganda value 
of the widespread rape of women during the Rwandan genocide is well-known. SEA is 
therefore used as a tool to manipulate perceptions at home and among the enemy and to 
provide valuable propaganda in support of the war effort. 
 
The SEA of women can thus be viewed as an overtly political act.25 In a war zone, there is a 
distinct likelihood that SEA will have both political causes and political consequences. By 
securing a source of income that helps underwrite the war economy and by fulfilling a 
propaganda role, SEA invariably provides political benefit to one party, and a collateral 
detriment to the other(s). Moreover, SEA often extends into the post-conflict period when 
UN or other peacekeeping forces have been deployed. In part, this is because the distinction 
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between the onset of conflict and its end is somewhat semantic – the systems, infrastructure 
and attitudes that operate during a conflict are likely to continue well after a ceasefire or 
peace agreement is signed.26 In addition, the propaganda value will not have diminished, as 
parties continue to distrust each other, particularly if one or more groups are unhappy with 
their spoils from the peace negotiations. Trafficking is also likely to continue as vulnerable, 
displaced individuals continue to be targeted, and those already caught in a trafficker’s web 
are unlikely to be released merely because the fighting is supposed to be over. In addition, as 
the UN identifies, ‘[o]ften the same figures that were in a position to exploit war-time 
economies are in a position to move quickly into high revenue, illicit goods and service 
economies in post-conflict environments’, including the trade in humans.27 Further, if there 
was no human-trafficking during the conflict itself, there is a distinct likelihood that it will 
begin to occur after. SEA is thus likely to be a lasting feature of any post-conflict society. It is 
against this backdrop that we examine SEA by UN peacekeepers. 
 
Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers 
 
The problem of SEA committed by UN peacekeepers came to a head in the early 2000s, with 
allegations of inappropriate sexual conduct between foreign personnel and women and 
children in the state to which a peacekeeping mission had been sent. As Kofi Annan 
remarked, it ‘brought shame upon the United Nations and upon those in its service.’28 The 
UN took steps to address the issue, both specifically and as part of its broader work on gender 
and peace and security, of which Resolution 1325 is a key tenet. However, the problem was 
not new and certainly did not begin with the allegations by aid agencies working in West 
Africa in the early 2000s. Academic, activist and media reports indicate that allegations have 
been made in missions as disparate as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Timor Leste.29 The then UN 
Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jane Holl Lute, contended that it 
was ‘[m]y operating presumption that this is either an ongoing or potential problem in every 
single one of our missions.’30 It appears that almost no peacekeeping operation has been 
exempt,31 but the concentration of missions in Africa means that a disproportionately high 
number of allegations tend to come from there. 
 
The level of such accusations is difficult to determine and varies significantly from mission to 
mission. Since 2003, the number of allegations made to the UN against its civilian and 
military personnel (the latter on loan from troop-contributing countries) is documented in 
annual reports to the General Assembly. These demonstrate that from 2003 to 2006, 358 
military personnel were investigated after allegations of SEA were made.32 However, there 
are two problems with these figures. First, there is limited information about how many of 
these allegations were substantiated. Anecdotally, it has been suggested that some cases are 
likely to have been fabricated, particularly in return for financial gain. Second, and 
conversely, there are undoubtedly many cases that have never come to light because the 
victims have not reported the occurrence out of shame or fear, or because they have, in some 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Peacekeeping 17 (2), 215-228. 
Published version available from: 10.1080/13533311003625100 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/17055/  
  
5 
 
cases, ‘chosen’ to engage in sexual activities such as prostitution. Overall, it seems almost 
certain that the number of incidents is higher than documented by the UN because of such 
underreporting. A survey among peacekeeping personnel in Cambodia confirms the view that 
SEA is widespread as a consequence of peacekeeping deployments. Indeed, 45 per cent of 
Dutch personnel participating in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia had ‘had sexual 
contact with sex workers or other members of the local population during a five month tour 
of duty’.33 If this statistic is replicated across the UN system, with 79,147 troops in the field 
at March 2009,34 the true figures of incidents of SEA are likely to run into the thousands.  
 
Specific information about the personnel accused can be difficult to obtain from the UN, 
which refrains from officially and routinely identifying the nationality of those accused of 
SEA, due in part to the political weight wielded by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in 
providing military and police personnel to missions in a context of shortages.35 Media 
reports, often tracked by campaigning organisations such as Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom,36 indicate that few TCCs have been untarnished, allegations having 
been made against peacekeepers from Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America. 
Admittedly, the authenticity and accuracy of many of these reports cannot be independently 
determined. This is particularly problematic given that the issue can be manipulated for 
propaganda purposes. Indeed, reports sometimes use the term ‘peacekeeper’ generically, to 
refer to civilian staff, police or military personnel not under UN authority. Nonetheless, the 
volume of reports from a variety of sources does suggest that the challenge facing the UN is 
on a widespread scale, with few missions and few TCCs exempted from allegations. 
Moreover, the actual figures of instances of SEA are perhaps less important than perceptions, 
given that, as the UN itself has identified, ‘a crisis of perception in relation to trafficking and 
the linked issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, which sees peacekeepers branded as more 
part of the problem than the solution.… The perception of peacekeeper involvement in [SEA] 
is now widespread.’ 37 
 
Finally, peacekeepers have been accused of committing various types of exploitation and 
abuse: sex with minors (under 18), employment for sex, sex with prostitutes, sexual assault, 
rape, and other incidents that include sex in exchange for food or assistance in kind.38 Media 
reports also suggest allegations of trafficking of individuals for prostitution and organized 
prostitution rings, abduction, the making of pornographic films and an organized paedophile 
ring.39 The problem of SEA is thus significant and, furthermore, some incidents of SEA will 
inevitably fall within the paradigm identified earlier in which it is possible to classify sexual 
violence during and after conflict as a political act. 
 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse as a Threat to Peacekeeping Impartiality 
 
According to resolution 1325 (para.5), the UN is committed ‘to incorporate a gender 
perspective into peacekeeping operations’. Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) has explicitly recognized that the involvement of peacekeepers in SEA 
damages UN credibility with respect not only to the UN’s international reputation but also to 
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its local reputation among the parties to conflict. It also links the involvement of personnel in 
SEA to its impact on the principle of impartiality to which all peacekeeping missions are 
supposed to adhere. UN guidance provided to peacekeepers states that personnel should 
represent ‘the highest integrity and impartiality’40 and that they ‘will never become involved 
in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality’.41 Yet, many cases of SEA represent 
two types of politicisation.  
 
First, it seems that some of the incidents involving UN personnel have been committed 
against women who have been trafficked or prostituted by a party to the conflict. UN police 
frequented Muslim prostitutes who were prostituted by Serb forces for money during the war 
in Bosnia.42 As the UN points out ‘it may be extremely difficult to differentiate between 
trafficking victims and local prostitution’.43 Thus, ‘there is strong anecdotal evidence of 
peacekeeping personnel having been involved in the use (knowingly or unknowingly) of 
sexual services of trafficking victims.’44 Indeed, the UN has explicitly recognized a nexus 
between war economies, the SEA of women, and the presence of military personnel: ‘UN 
peacekeepers should expect to find trafficking and exploitation emerging in its areas of 
operations, even as the first personnel arrive. Senior managers of missions should assume that 
traffickers will target UN personnel for revenue’.45 
 
Second, the propaganda value of such behaviour to parties to the conflict can be used to 
undermine an international presence and the political process that seeks to sustain peace. For 
example, in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge used peacekeepers’ frequenting of prostitutes, 
including Vietnamese prostitutes, to argue that the troops were neglecting to monitor 
Vietnamese forces in the area and were thus supporting Vietnamese interference in 
Cambodia.46 Similar problems occurred in Rwanda, local media accusing the UN Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda of being pro-Tutsi following incidents between some Belgian troops and 
Tutsi women.47 The government of Sudan has also used SEA as a tactic to prevent or delay 
the deployment of a UN mission to Darfur.48 As the DPKO acknowledges, such behaviour 
provides ‘material for anti-UN elements, obstructionists and negative media campaigns... 
Opponents of peace missions are increasingly aware that the issue can be effectively 
exploited to undermine the moral authority and political leverage of UN operations’.49 Thus, 
for those whose political aim is the continuation of the conflict or to try to secure peace on 
more favourable terms than might otherwise have been available, SEA provides a useful 
propaganda tool and is thus a political issue. That is not to say that UN personnel necessarily 
intend to bring about any of the political consequences that follow from acts of SEA. Being 
seen to be impartial is a vital element of actually being impartial, and thus, if peacekeepers’ 
behaviour is seen as partial by the parties to the conflict, motivations are likely to be 
immaterial.  
 
Wider Implications 
 
Where does the problem of SEA leave UN claims to impartiality? In order to address this 
question, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the term ‘impartiality’. The UN has 
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developed theoretical principles that are supposed to be applied to all missions, ensuring that 
any operation ‘is based on the trinity of consent, neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in 
self-defence’.50 These elements represent the cornerstones of the deployment of force in the 
search for peace. Historically, any force deployed was done so only with the consent of the 
state into whose territory it was deployed, and with the consent of any of the other warring 
factions involved. Peacekeepers were also supposed to use force only in self-defence, or more 
expansively, in defence of the mission itself. Practically, the notion of neutrality was 
established in order to prevent the UN from becoming drawn into the conflicts it was 
attempting to cajole the parties into resolving. The trinity of inter-related elements – consent, 
neutrality and self-defence – was necessary (a) to ensure mission viability with limited 
financial, logistical, and perhaps political, resources available, (b) to provide moral authority 
over the warring-parties51 and (c) to keep TCCs sufficiently satisfied that their personnel 
were not in serious harm’s way.52 Legally, neutrality and impartiality distinguish 
peacekeeping from peace enforcement, where the aim of the mission is to advance the 
military position of one or more parties to the conflict,53 although the distinction between 
these two types of mission is increasingly blurred.54 Moreover, Tsagourias notes that the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality are of such significance and consequence because 
they correspond with Article 40 of the UN Charter, which provides the illusive legal basis for 
such missions.55 It reads: ‘In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security 
Council may … call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as 
it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the 
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned’ (emphasis added). 
 
Derek Bowett, for example, suggests that this was the legal basis for the first UN mission in 
the Congo.56 Peacekeeping was seen as a ‘provisional measure’ and the requirement that it be 
‘without prejudice to the … parties’ was therefore equated with the principle of neutrality. In 
essence, the political and military status of the parties should not be affected by the stationing 
of troops on disputed territory: the parties retain the political position that they held at the 
point when the UN force was deployed. Thus, peacekeeping forces should be apolitical.57 If 
this interpretation of the Charter is correct, a peacekeeping force must act in a neutral and 
impartial way in order to remain intra vires.58 Even if this interpretation is incorrect, UN and 
academic understanding has stuck so doggedly to the principles of neutrality and impartiality 
that they are said to ‘have acquired constitutional status’59 as a foundation stone for 
peacekeeping missions. Yet the meaning and use of the terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ 
have developed over the evolution of peacekeeping operations. 
 
Development of the Two Principles  
 
The notion of neutrality was developed first and covered peacekeepers’ relations with the 
parties: ‘[t]hey were not there to advance the interests of one party against those of the 
other.’60 The use of the term ‘parties’ was taken to mean the warring factions, between which 
the UN attempted to establish a buffer-zone with a view to facilitating negotiations.61 One of 
the first UN peacekeeping missions, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in Egypt in 
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1956, established this tenet on the basis that troops would be stationed within the sovereign 
state, but with ‘no intent… to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, 
thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict’.62 Moreover, the 
deployment of force ‘was not meant to and could not effect any change in their [the 
conflicting parties’] prior status juris’.63 This made the stationing of foreign troops in a state 
acceptable to the sovereign host government and others with claims to the territory.64 Being 
neutral meant, in part, being seen to be neutral. As Shashi Tharoor remarks, 
 
the only way peacekeepers can work is by being trusted on both sides, 
being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping lines of 
communication open. The moment they lose this trust, the moment they 
are seen by one side as the ‘enemy’, they become part of the problem 
they were sent to solve.65  
 
From UNEF on, neutrality was established as a prerequisite for the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation.66 
 
However, since the development of so-called ‘robust peacekeeping’ in the 1990s, this core 
principle has been modified. In particular, the difficulties in Somalia, Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia ‘sometimes obliged peacekeepers to maintain normal relations with a party 
whose behaviour was being censured by most of the international community’.67 The UN was 
thus seen to be acquiescing in incidents of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Subsequently, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi 
Report) argued neutrality be replaced with the revised concept of impartiality. The Brahimi 
Report contended that ‘[i]mpartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to 
the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter 
principles ... impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all 
cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement.’ In particular, where there 
were ‘obvious aggressors and victims’ in a conflict, peacekeepers could be ‘operationally 
justified’ as well as ‘morally compelled’ to ‘oppose obvious evil’, for example, by the use of 
force against genocidaires.68  
 
The previously ‘neutral’ position of UN peacekeepers was thus jettisoned in favour of a 
stance of ‘impartiality’.69 Impartiality implies that a peacekeeping operation should actively 
espouse certain principles, including those of fairness and justice, which may require active 
involvement in order to further such ideals.70 In the early 1990s when the UN was accused of 
failing to respond appropriately to widespread violence against civilians or to defend the 
mandate of operations, which increasingly referred to civilian protection, a new discourse 
became fashionable: ‘After the Safe Havens, neutrality is a four-letter word’... ‘[i]mpartiality 
is what the UN is supposed to be doing’.71 This impartiality requires that the treatment of the 
parties is subject to the principles in the Charter: peacekeepers are expected to behave in a 
fair and unbiased way, without prejudice to the parties’ conflicting political interests, but at 
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the same time behaving in accordance with international law and human rights.72 The 2008 
Principles and Guidelines for peacekeeping operations, states, 
 
United Nations peacekeeping operations must implement their mandate 
without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to 
maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should 
not be confused with neutrality or inactivity … Just as a good referee is 
impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation 
should not condone actions by the parties that violate … international 
norms and principles.73 
 
Moreover, this idea of impartiality, framed as being subject to overriding Charter ideals, is 
increasingly compelling when considered in the context of the ‘emerging norm’74 of the 
responsibility to protect. This concept posits that ‘there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention 
as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have 
proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.’75 While the concept is highly contested on a 
variety of grounds,76 the notion that UN missions should protect civilians and not contravene 
liberal norms has gained ground.77  
 
Yet, the involvement of peacekeepers in SEA in a host state contravenes the principle of 
impartiality. If SEA during conflict brings about political benefits for the conflicting parties, 
then peacekeepers’ involvement in SEA cannot be without prejudice to such parties’ 
positions. Peacekeepers are also failing to abide by UN Charter ideals and liberal norms such 
as human rights. Thus, SEA renders them partial. Any future implementation of the 
responsibility to protect would also obviously be compromised by acts of SEA committed by 
those empowered with such a responsibility. Manifestly, peacekeepers should not abuse those 
they are sent to protect: as Prince Raad bin Zeid argues, ‘the United Nations has been 
mandated to enter into a broken society to help it, not to breach the trust placed in it by the 
local population.’78 As Dyan Mazurana explains, ‘by taking part in the sex trade, 
peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers support economies that maintain instability in the 
region, perpetuate abuses of women’s, girls’ and boys’ human rights, further entrench 
systems of inequality and exploitation, and, thus, thwart a return to real peace and human 
security.’79 Such breaches are exacerbated by the lack of redress available in cases of SEA, 
given the immunity from which peacekeepers benefit and the UN’s reliance on the TCC to 
take action against any of its offending uniformed personnel, which appears rare, despite the 
Security Council calling for an end to impunity for gender-based crimes in Resolution 1325.80 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UN has recognized that sexual behaviour by its personnel ‘has been a source of major 
embarrassment and political damage’ and that ‘the political and moral stigma attached to this 
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behaviour can taint entire missions’ leaving them ‘exposed and vulnerable to attacks on their 
credibility’.81 Nonetheless, despite instructing personnel that they should ‘never become 
involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality’,82 the UN has not elaborated 
on whether SEA has undermined impartiality in particular cases, and if so, what the 
consequences were for peacekeeping operations. However, this article has argued that 
political consequences flow from such behaviour, not least with regard to the difficulty of 
maintaining the cooperation of the parties to the conflict in the search for a peaceful solution. 
 
For those advocating concerted action against peacekeepers accused of committing acts of 
SEA, and full implementation of resolution 1325, there is value in examining the issue of 
impartiality as the concept is part of the dominant discourse of peace operations. Feminists 
have long debated the merits of addressing gender inequality by engaging with institutional 
discourses as a vehicle for solving discrimination against women, rather than viewing such 
institutions as a manifestation of the problem of patriarchy.83 They have deliberated whether 
engaging in feminist problem-solving in the international arena disables women from 
adopting a sufficiently critical perspective. Feminist academics may also accept that in order 
to be activists it is necessary to engage with those who have the power to alleviate 
discrimination against women. As Sandra Whitworth suggests, ‘in order to be “heard” within 
this [the UN] context, arguments must be presented in a way that adopts the language of the 
UN, accommodates itself to UN-produced understandings of peace and security, and is alert 
to the hierarchies, protocols, and “stories” by which UN personnel define themselves.’84 Re-
envisaging SEA by UN peacekeepers as a threat to impartiality, and identifying the 
consequences of this for the UN, may have the power to increase pressure on the UN to 
implement and extend existing policies. Furthermore, if impartiality is central to the 
philosophy of UN peacekeeping, then anything which threatens it should not be tolerated. By 
framing SEA as a threat to peacekeeping impartiality, feminists can be ‘heard’ at the UN. 
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